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Abstract 
This study summarizes the traditional characteristics of the Spanish Social 
Security System (generally taken from the European model), the different le-
gal reforms that have come into force in recent years and the degree of pene-
tration of important financial groups in the mass media ‒which increased 
with the last financial crisis‒ as well as the role developed by the insurance 
and financial entities benefiting from the change of model. The conclusion is 
that we are at the beginning of an interesting change in the Social Security 
model, aimed at the capitalization of social contributions by the private sec-
tor, which will obtain significant economic benefits in the management of 
old-age risk. 
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1. Introduction 
Is the (financial) market the solution to the problems of the European Social Se-
curity systems that emerged after World War II? Based on a pay-as-you-go ba-
sis—the technical translation of the values of professional and intergenerational 
solidarity—they seem quite unable to ensure their future sustainability in the 
mid and long terms due to increased life expectancy, lower birth rates and high 
unemployment rates. This diagnosis is not new: economic difficulties have ac-
companied Social Security ever since it started (Durand, 1953; Venturi, 1954). 
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The novelty lies in the proposed solutions: an appeal, to a greater or lesser ex-
tent, to the financial market, and in the social, parliamentary and citizen consensus 
that gives rise to this solution. This consensus is not coincidental: for years, global 
financial power has landed in most mass media to create a “unique” solution for the 
crisis of pay-as-you-go models: its capitalization in the financial market. 
2. The European Social Security Model: Demarketising  
(or Publification) Social Needs 
The effect that European social reformers’ historic option (AA.VV, 2007; 
GÓMEZ MOLLEDA, 1988) to favour tax-paying-professional-type Social Secu-
rity systems (SSS) had was to shape an inseparable work-Social Security binomi-
al. More specifically, the determining factor of this relation was the appeal of the 
insurance technique. After the subsidised freedom system failed, which was in-
itially put to the test by the National Social Security Institute (1908), the next 
stage in building an SSS was to make compulsory the securing of some risks de-
riving from rendering services as employees in the new industrial society. This 
industrial revolution-alienation connection of work/worker was key for manag-
ing SSSs, and also for delimiting the population protected by these systems. The 
State’s scarce economic capacity, marked by the politico-economic liberalism of 
the time, the working class’s insufficient resources and the close link of promo-
ters of social security to insurance companies all determined, on the one hand, 
the need to involve the employers of the new working class in financing social 
protection, along with the beneficiary and the State; on the other hand, the ap-
peal of the insurance technique as a mechanism to distribute recently socialised 
risks. In fact, it applied only to workers less financially well off. So, it is possible 
to state that the “social” adjective of the first social security had a very different 
meaning to that employed today. 
Performing occupational activities not only conditioned citizens belonging to 
or being registered (only relevant as workers) with social security, but also in-
volved many other effects; e.g., workers’ needed to continue with this working 
relationship whenever the risk materialised (registration or similar situation), or 
the payments they made to the system (demand of the exclusion period for ben-
efits deriving from common disease). In general, these effects continue today, 
save some exceptions or nuances. Economic SSS provisions are outlined as in-
come that substitutes lost salary income as a result of updating protected risks, 
and it was only after many years did this connection weaken, but did not break, 
by allowing access to some economic provisions when not registered or being in 
a similar situation1. The system responsible for provisions when business obliga-
 
 
1Law 26/1985, of 31 July, allowed access to full permanent disability and retirement for non-registration or 
similar situations. However, a previous tax-paying period longer than the classic assumed case of 
accessing from non-registration or similar situations is expected. Law 40/2007, of 4 December, also 
allowed access from non-registration or similar situations to wid-ow/widower and orphan’s 
pensions. Law 40/2007 also abolished the requirement of an exclusion period to access an orphan’s 
pension when the workers who led to this risk situation died while being registered or in a similar 
situation. his connection weaken, but did not break, by allowing access to some economic provi-
sions when not registered or being in a similar situation. 
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tions are not met is a clear example that still prevails, and one that is especially 
significant in retirement matters (AESSS, 2012). 
It was not by chance that the first social security was the so-called “Retiro Ob-
rero” (Workers Retirement; 1919), which became compulsory as of 1921, and it 
was a capitalisation financing system. As it acted as an instrument to accomplish 
“social peace”, it undoubtlessly played a pacifying role given the advantage of 
not paying provisions in the short/mid terms. Even in the long term, it did not 
involve taking large economic risks when the retirement age was set at 65 years 
because life expectancy then did not reach that age. For some cases, many years 
still had to go by for compulsory insurance to cover those social risks that de-
termined more immediate protection: maternity (1929); illness (1942); disability 
(1947); death and survival (1955); unemployment (1961). 
Today, the Spanish SSS has been characterised since its beginning (1967) by 
the following features: 
1) Socialising the risk of losing worker salary income by means of the insur-
ance technique. Initially, protected risks were directly linked to occupational ac-
tivity (work retirement; maternity; illness; disability; old-age death and survival; 
unemployment, and other risks (paternity leave; caring for minors with cancer 
or other serious diseases; joint responsibility in the care of the child) were socia-
lised in more recent times. 
2) Cohabitation, for which the level of protection is quite unequal, has two le-
vels of protection: paying taxes and not paying taxes. Since the latter was passed 
(Law 26/1990 of 20 December), provisions and the area they cover are virtually 
identical. Only three risks are attended by not paying taxes: dependant children, 
disability and old-age. Always it is necessary that the beneficiary does not receive 
annual income exceeding 5488 euros (2019). 
3) Separating financing sources among both levels of protection: professional 
financing based on contributions to the tax-paying level and tax financing for 
the non-tax-paying level. Since the Toledo Pact (1995) and its legal specifications 
(1997), all the provisions of the TRLGSS (the General Social Security Law) that 
are non-tax-paying are fiscally financed, including minimum pension supple-
ments. Professional financing is provided by employers and workers; the State 
does not participate in the financing of this tax level. High levels of unemploy-
ment mean a loss of contributions in addition to an increase in expenses. 
4) The option of a pay-as-you-go financial system as a sign of “intergenera-
tional” solidarity because the whole amount paid by tax payments by all workers 
is used to pay the pensions of those who, from the same time period, receive 
pensions. That is, the pay-as-you-go system excludes accumulated capital and it 
being placed on the capitals market, save any surpluses that might arise at any 
time, which would form part of reserve funds. Low birth rate, the progressive 
increase in life expectancy and the high level of unemployed workers constitute 
serious problems in these distribution systems. Spain has the lowest birth rate in 
the European Union (7.95 per mile), the third highest life expectancy in the 
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world (80.5 years old for men; 85.9 years old for women)2 and very high levels of 
structural unemployment, especially among young people3. 
5) Outlining economic provisions from the tax-paying level as substitute sala-
ry income so that, for retirement and the generally disappeared forced retire-
ment, when the risk materialises two circumstances are expected (either simul-
taneous or not) concurring: having reached the set age in each case and having 
left work. 
6) In relation to point 5), the traditional incompatibility of being paid a re-
tirement pension while working, regardless of working for oneself or someone 
else. 
3. Risk Factors and Reforms: From the Initial Reduction in 
Public Pensions Sufficiency to the Paradigm Shift of 
Protection 
3.1. Risk Factors 
Two viruses can apparently affect the health of SSSs: an aging population 
(Errandonea Ulazia, 2019) and high unemployment rates. The dependence of 
pay-as-you-go systems of both variables, which will become critical when the 
baby boom generation reaches retirement age, has led the lawmaker to take 
measures to ensure the system’s sustainability. It is worth pointing out that po-
litical discourse is identical in all European countries, regardless of their life ex-
pectancies and unemployment rates, and even their demographic differences, or 
any other national peculiarity for that matter (population; GDP; national debt, 
social expenditure, tax rates, etc.). Even the language that public discourse re-
sorts to has undergone an interesting mutation: sustainability is no longer eco-
nomic, but financial; whereas what is economic turns to efficient administra-
tions to meet the human material needs of those with few assets, and what is fi-
nancial refers to bank or stock exchange issues. A pay-as-you-go system does not 
require financial sustainability, rather economic resources (which never abound) 
being suitably and efficiently administered. 
3.2. Reforms 
For some years now, the lawmaker has taken different measures to manage the 
SSS’s limited resources. In the Spanish case, the lawmaker employs reforms 
adopted from a parliamentary and social consensus in an attempt to obtain a 
well-backed institution in Spain from an electoral and social conflict. This con-
sensus also offers a less compliant interpretation, which is presented later. Basi-
cally, these adopted measures are to ensure the SSS’s sustainability. Specifically, 
the following have acted as its main pillar (Vicente Palacio, 2015): 
1) Requirements to access a retirement pension have progressively become 
 
 
2See INE, “Life Expectancy”, (oct. 2019).  
https://www.ine.es/ss/Satellite?L=es_ES&c=INESeccion_C&cid=1259926380048&p=1254735110672
&pagename=ProductosYServicios/PYSLayout (Consultation date: 15-1-2020).  
3All this date at https://datosmacro.expansion.com/paro/espana (Consultation date: 15-1-2020). 
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stricter. Without referring to possible sustainability problems4, the demanded 
exclusion period has been prolonged by going from 10 to 15 years (1985). 
Moreover, the classic jurisprudential days-contribution doctrine, which made 
fulfilling this requirement easily, was ended by the lawmaker years later (2007)5 
by the application to retirement pensions being expressly abolished, where fi-
nancial sustainability appeared on two occasions as the reason for driving the 
reform in a complex co-existence with reinforced solidarity principles and 
tax-paying also appealed for by the reform. 
It is worth referring to the consequences of working part-time when calculat-
ing the exclusion period; after several “comings and goings” in which the Courts 
intervention played a key role, nowadays the global part-time coefficient outlines 
the materialisation of the proportionality principle being strictly applied to ho-
rizontal-type part-time work. However, this does not apply to the vertical type 
given the discriminatory dealings that the CJEU considered for unemployment 
benefit (which has been legally corrected for this benefit by RD 950/2018, of 28 
July). 
2) The parameters followed to calculate the quantity of pensions have been 
another aspect which the lawmaker has insisted on by extending the spectrum to 
include newly taken measures in recent years. They all converge for the same 
purpose: to reduce expenditure, not by better managing resources, but by cutting 
the quantity of pensions. 
The increase in the computable period used to calculate pensions has gone 
from 5 (1974) to 8 years (1985), and then on to 15 years (1997) and next to 25 
years (2013), which will fully come into force on 01/01/2022. That is, the refer-
ence period to calculate the exclusion period has multiplied 5-fold in 47 years 
(AA.VV, 2012; López Cumbre, 2012). 
The reduction in the quantity of pensions that derives from this extension has 
been made worse by other further reforms. The increase in the number of 
tax-paying years (37 years) expected to be paid a 100% pension, especially the 
reduction in gaps being included, whose likelihood increases with the reference 
regulatory base period being prolonged: if before its inclusion was ensured by 
using the whole minimum tax-paying regulatory base for people over the age of 
a) 
 
 
4Law 26/1985, of 31 July: “Ever since the economic crisis began, the view that Social Security re-
quires profound reforms has been a constant generalised notion, a point which, and one that can be 
asserted, is supported unanimously by the most representative social and political forces today. 
However, this long-standing process has led to imbalances in the system that negatively affect the 
economy and employment, and endanger the success of the reform itself being made to ensure its 
feasibility; in particular, the level and necessary updating of pensions. The measures passed in this 
law are included in this first phase, that of rectifying the most obvious and urgent defects and devia-
tions, and pursuing these objectives: reinforce the professional, tax-paying and proportional nature 
of retirement and disability pensions; better correlate non-tax-payment protection; improve protec-
tive efficiency by reordering resources; streamline the System’s structure”. 
5Law 40/2007, of 4 December: “(…) and all this forms part of the demands resulting from the so-
cio-demographic situation, with some highlighted circumstances like an ageing population, more 
women entering the labour market and the immigration phenomenon, as well as harmonising cri-
teria that move towards what is pointed out in the EU area to ensure the pension system’s financial 
sustainability.” 
b)  
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18, then this guarantee was limited (2011) to 48 monthly payments because it 
limited the inclusion of the remaining monthly periods to 50% of that regulatory 
base. In both cases, and for part-time workers (Ruano Albertos, 2019), the 
minimum tax-paying regulatory base to bear in mind corresponds to the num-
ber of contracted hours as a last resort, which is completely removed from the of 
tax-paying and proportionality rules that have so often been appealed for. 
Limiting minimum pension supplements to the annual amount of non-
tax-paying pensions also reduces public protection. Separating financing 
sources between both the system’s levels and what then (1997) seemed to be a 
reasonable measure of sending minimum pension supplements to tax financing 
as a sign of national solidarity, which is no longer professional as it was before, 
and using any tax-payment surpluses to build reserve funds have become a reac-
tionary measure. Its purpose is not to avoid transferring funds from the 
tax-paying level to the non-tax-paying level, but quite the reverse: sufficiency at 
the tax-paying level is reduced under the guise of the supposedly egalitarian 
processing of tax-financed protection. 
Moreover, it is worth mentioning the reform made of the revaluation system 
and the introduction of the Sustainability Factor. The variables contemplated by 
the new Revaluation Index (2011) the income and expenditure of the pensions 
system, the number of pensioners and the evolution of the mean pension‒ are 
exclusively linked to the system’s financial sustainability, and not to the suffi-
ciency of pensions, nor to its purchasing power being maintained. As all these 
variables are expected to negatively evolve in forthcoming years, the reform 
merely becomes the application of an absurdly low minimum guarantee of a 
0.25% RPI Index for a long period of time. The vague agreement met during the 
Parliamentary Committee of the Toledo Pact allows several interpretations, and 
we will have to wait and see what will happen with the 2019 General State Budgets. 
Finally, the Sustainability Factor (2013) acts directly on determining the initial 
amount of the retirement pension using a variable not linked to tax payments 
and proportionality: life expectancy. This is a cynical manipulation of the “in-
tergenerational solidarity” concept, with positive impacts on the natural justice 
areas. In order to “adjust the initial pension so that the total amount that a pen-
sioner who accesses the pensions system is paid all his/her life, in a certain 
number of years time, and who will predictably enjoy a longer life expectancy, 
will be the equivalent to what someone who retired earlier was paid”. The system 
has been transformed from a model with defined payments and provisions to a 
mere indeterminate provisions model (Tortuero Plaza, 2014; Suárez Corujo, 
2014; Monereo Pérez & Fernández Bernat, 2014). Then yet another characteristic 
of the new modernity appears: the State accepting to play a residual role in 
managing risk, a role that must be limited to promoting protection by capitalist 
financial mechanisms. The increase in both life expectancy and quality of life is 
actually a problem rather than a social conquest, and this new risk is a new mar-
ket niche (reflexive society) for a newly released and increasingly powerful capi-
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talism. 
It is worth referring to the successive reforms made to the compatibility re-
gime of the retirement pension with work (Monereo Pérez & Rodríguez Iniesta, 
2016). While the protection of old age has developed, the lawmaker has resorted 
to various denominations, and it is hard deciding whether these changes simply 
obey the will to distinguish them from their predecessors, or if they respond to a 
change in the risk or protected situation. One author points out that the Retiro 
Obrero (Workers Retirement) never established the incompatibility of a pension 
with work, but express legal prohibition was possibly unnecessary because if on-
ly a few workers who were included in its area of application reached the age of 
65, even fewer would do so if they continued with the occupational role. Indeed 
the relation that the lawmaker establishes between work and the right to be paid 
a pension is a clear indication of the circumstance of need that is economically 
protected by today’s “retirement” pension. 
Our SSS today explicitly establishes an incompatibility between work and the 
retirement pension, and generally with all pensions, as well as with permanent 
disability6. Logically there are differences between both, but the circumstance of 
protected need is (was) identical in both cases: loss of income earned by working 
when having left work due to either workers’ age or their inability to continue 
doing their work. Economic provisions are, thus, outlined as income which 
substitutes that income once earned by a salary, with some outstanding excep-
tion7. If a retired pensioner still worked, his/her pension was suspended, and 
new tax payments would not affect the quantity of his/her retirement pension 
when (s)he eventually left work, and when the pension was once again paid. 
It was within the framework of the (initial) soft policies to delay access to a re-
tirement pension and to promote work (2002) when a retirement pension being 
compatible with doing part-time work was allowed for the first time, and new 
tax payments were recognised to affect the amount of the pension in the same 
way as the assumed cases of flexible retirement did, which were also outlined as 
doing part-time work. As the general increase in the minimum age to access a 
 
 
6One particular situation is the widow/widowhood pension, whose characterisation is deliberately 
omitted. The permissive compatibility regime of the permanent disability pension and its absolute 
or considerable degrees of disability with work is the result of the jurisprudential interpretation 
(2002 and following years) of a precept, whose literal meaning has not changed since 1974 (save 
when incompatibility was recently established when workers reach the age to access retirement). 
This interpretation has even managed to recognise the right to take into account the new tax pay-
ments made when permanent disability is suspended by performing one’s occupation to calculate 
the regulatory base of the permanent disability pension that is later resumed [Supreme Court Sen-
tence of 25-4-2018 (no. rec. 2322/2016)]. 
7Partial Permanent Disability; Permanent Non-Incapacitating Injuries (for professional contingen-
cies) and Compensations as lump sums in cases of death due to professional contingencies. Like-
wise, it is precisely a reconsideration of widow/widowhood cover. Many options are available, but 
recovering economic dependence is necessary as a real circumstance of protected need, without 
prejudice to setting compensatory temporary measures to allow the surviving partner to adjust 
his/her economy to the new family circumstances. The obtained savings should help to improve 
orphanage protection and widow-widowerhood protection whenever a circumstance of need ac-
tually comes into play. 
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retirement pension seemed an impossible measure to be taken within the so-
cio-parliamentary consensus framework, paying a partial pension for a certain 
time seemed a preferable solution to paying the full amount. Among other rea-
sons, the very few incentives set up to make these measures appealing, along 
with suspected unfair use, led to successive regulatory reforms that have gradu-
ally made requirements stricter. 
The regime currently in force, and assumedly extraordinary, of a retirement 
pension being compatible with work, indicates the subtle transformation of the 
circumstance of protected need, which no longer entails loss of income from 
leaving work due to the “presumed” impossibility of working due to age (as veri-
fied by lack of occupational activity), but merely implies reaching the age at 
which the old age threshold is set. The retirement pension comes over as a pe-
riodical recovery of paid (saved) quotas that comes in the purest old-age annuity 
insurance form, even if the pay-as-you-go system is maintained (notional ac-
counts). The insurance technique, which has never completely disappeared from 
our SSS, takes the leading role by converting the insured risk (old age) into a 
protected circumstance (old age). 
In the ordinary scheme (Art. 213 of the Revised Text of the General Social 
Security Law), the compatibility of a retirement pension with doing part-time 
work is allowed by lowering, in this particular case, the amount of the pension 
by a percentage of the working day that the employee works. However, this 
compatibility becomes notably flexible when work is done by self-employed 
workers because the system allows 100% of the retirement pension being paid to 
these workers, provided the income paid for their work does not exceed 100% 
the minimum interprofessional wage. Given the difficulty of controlling 
self-employed workers’ income, this measure evidently implies completely 
opening up the compatibility of the retirement pension with self-employed work 
without the system obtaining a “return of solidarity” because this work is exempt 
from tax payments8 (see also Ballester Pastor, 2018). For the time being, cutting 
the number of the unemployed justifies excluding the retirement pension being 
completely compatible with self-employed work in general, but not with the Ex-
traordinary Scheme. Indeed, another type of reason, which has nothing to do 
with the employment policy, inspires regulating the compatibility set out in Art. 
214 of the RTGSSL. This precept allows a retirement pension to be compatible 
with self-employment or working as an employee, regardless of work being 
full-time or part-time, as long as the worker has accessed a retirement pension as 
of the minimum set age, and provided the percentage applied to the regulatory 
base to determine pensions is 100%. The amount of pension lowers by 50% in 
general, the percentage is 100% if the working activity is the self-employed type 
and if having contracted at least one employee can be proven. 
 
 
8This estimation is deeply rooted in the classic problem of defining the field to apply the Special 
Self-Employed Scheme (SSES): if the compulsory nature of being registered with the SSES only 
takes place when the self-employed worker’s income equals or exceeds the amount of the minimum 
interprofessional wage. 
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If we now leave to one side any discrepancies about this last compatability 
being applied by the National Social Security Institute, the gradual acceptance of 
the retirement pension being compatible with doing work abounds in the change 
made to the circumstance protected by an old-age pension. Age does not imply 
the physical impossibility of performing a professional activity, but having 
reached a given age at which one can recover the tax payments made to an old 
age “insurance”, even though the income that work provides has not actually 
been (for the time being, completely) lost. No doubt the flexibility of the compa-
tibility regime is also connected with the reduction in the rate at which the re-
tirement pension is replaced with the reforms made in recent years. The law-
maker is removing obstacles to allow pensioners to supplement their pension 
with income they earn from working by seeking protection from manipulating 
the “active aging” concept because, albeit true that this concept in its early days 
actually dealt with the occupational dimension to a certain extent, the truth is 
that the definition handled by the WHO is far removed as far as necessary old 
age security and cares are concerned in relation to the consequences expected of 
any reforms made to protect old age. 
4. The Uniqueness of Solutions: Is It a Change in the  
Economically Neutral Paradigm? 
4.1. The Financing Problem 
Financing is the main stumbling block for any SSS because economic resources 
are always limited (LÓpez Cumbre, 2015; Rojas Rivero, 2014). And this was also 
true back in 1919 (Retiro Obrero) and continues to be so today in both 
pay-as-you-go and capitalisation systems. Indeed, the terms social security and 
crisis have formed an inseparable binomial since the former was set up. Those 
who propel the social securities all over Europe (Durand, 1953; Venturi, 1954) 
insist on seeking suitable solutions that have replaced and been adapted to dif-
ferent socio-economic situations, and have led most European countries to 
adopt a professional/tax-paying system financed by contributions based on pro-
fessional solidarity supplemented by a non-tax-paying and universal system 
founded on national solidarity (Tortuero Plaza, 2018). The failure of the capita-
lisation in the first tested insurances led to a financial pay-as-you-go system be-
ing adopted (1931), albeit with its limitations, and SSS became an instrument of 
solidarity among workers, and also an intergenerational instrument. The nega-
tive evolution of the demographic variables on which pay-as-you-go systems 
depend so much has been well-known for decades. However, this has not hin-
dered the European countries with low unemployment levels that set up meas-
ures to increase birth rates from undertaking systemic reforms, reforms that will 
remain after baby boomers have disappeared (De Paz Cobo, 2013). 
All these reforms have generally been characterised by the gradual introduc-
tion of capitalisation measures, also in the public protection area, to a greater or 
lesser extent (vid. also AESSS, 2013). It was not until quite recently when debate 
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about capitalisation was limited to the supplementary level, especially within the 
public promotion scope of private public pension supplements, but it was still 
not considered an alternative to the public system. The scope of the reforms 
made by some European countries in recent years, encouraged by community in-
stitutions as part of the Open Coordination Method (Art. 160 of the Treaty) (vid. 
also CAIROS BARRETO, 2015; Moreno Romero, 2015), is quite different: capi-
talisation also reaches a compulsory stage, specifically the professional/ 
tax-paying level, with capitalisation in which, moreover, the public area cedes its 
traditional socialisation area to favour private initiatives. If the social protection 
system has involved demarketising some individual requirements via socialisa-
tion, then the call for private capitalisation in the protection area of the compul-
sory public system implies completely abandoning the traditional principle of 
professional solidarity, which is a reformulation of the social contract that has 
governed the European social model for the past 100 years (Villa Gil, 2012). 
According to the Spanish Centre of Sociological Research’s Barometer, in 
March 2018 concern about pensions was one of the three main problems for 
15.5% of Spaniards: this doubled the rate recorded for the previous month, and 
was the highest rate it had ever reached9 (vid. ext. Sánchez Rodas, 2018). So, 
what has happened for this matter to be so deeply rooted in individuals and so-
ciety, who are convinced that the present system is not sustainable and is in an 
irreversible situation to require a completely changed model? 
4.2. Uniform Social Thinking: Role of the Media 
One of the characteristics of the “risk society” (BECK, 1986), which sociology 
predicted very early (Vicente Palacio, 2013), was the complete dominion of mass 
media by pressure groups linked to either the most brutal capitalism or, if appli-
cable, to public powers, to produce uniform social thinking. The twist in infor-
mation and the handling of emotions, particularly fear, over a continuous period 
of time does away with rationality, and leads individuals and society to be con-
vinced about the unidirection nature of solutions that are neither social nor 
economically neutral. 
Although the unquestionable financing problem of a model that depends so much 
on the two factors that will clearly evolve negatively in the future is undeniable, this 
change in social mentality is very much due to financial capitalism progressively 
controlling several corridors of power. Even the language used has subtly changed. 
Economic feasibility or sustainability has become financial sustainability10; legal 
 
 
9See this evolution at  
http://www.cis.es/cis/export/sites/default/-Archivos/Indicadores/documentos_html/TresProblemas.
html. 
10The Toledo Pact does not refer to sustainability and its normative materialisation: Law 24/1997, of 
15 July contains one reference about the system being feasible. Nor is there any reference made to 
sustainability in Law 35/2002, of 12 July. Law 40/2007, of 4 December twice refers to “financial sus-
tainability”. Law 27/2011, of 1 August, mentions financial sustainability 7 times. Finally, Law 
23/2013, of 23 December, indicates the “sustainability” concept 37 times. However, this can be con-
sidered normal because the regulation controls the Sustainability Factor, and constant repetition of 
an idea plays the social “normalisation” role. 
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regulations seek an indoctrinating purpose11; trade unions and political parties, 
which do not take liberal positions, sign parliamentary pacts and social agree-
ments by punishing the political correction of new (unidirectional) recipes and 
accept the State’s new residual role of managing the social risk12. All this is ap-
plauded by mass media which, as a result of the economic-financial crisis, have 
gone to being under the control of capitalist funds, as well as the only beneficia-
ries of the capital transferred to the financial market, which involves changing 
the social protection model. 
Nowadays (2018), the Prisa Group’s stakeholders include important capitalist 
funds: Amber Capital; Adar Capital; HSBC; Banco Santander13. Mediaset España 
is in the hands of not only Finisvent (50.21%), one of the most important finan-
cial groups of Italy linked to the Berlusconi family, but also the French Vivendi 
Group14. Practically all Grupo Editorial belongs to RCS Mediagrup (96%) which, 
in turn, belongs to Comunicación El Cairo (59.9%) and to several other financial 
and insurance companies (Compania di San Paolo; Credit Agricola; Banca Fire-
nze CR; Generali; Blackrock), which belong to the most important insurance and 
financial groups, and appear among the top commercialisation ranking positions 
in Spain of CII (Collective Investment Institutions) and Pensions Funds in 
Spain15. The main national newspapers with general information (El País and El 
Mundo) and with economic information (Cinco Días and Expansión) are in the 
hands of these publishing houses. So, it is not surprising to notice a marked in-
crease in recent years in news and opinion pieces about our public pensions sys-
 
 
11Law 27/2011, of 1 August (DA.19ª): is a mandate to conduct a study about developing supple-
mentary social provisions “and about measures that could be taken to promote its development in 
Spain”; Law 23/2013, of 23 December: (Sustainability Factor) “The first year for it to be applied in 
shall be 2019, which allows a sufficiently long period so that, until that time, potential retirement 
pensioners can be informed about the consequencing of putting this factor into practice and to take 
any measures if they deem them necessary”. 
12The Toledo Pact (1995) still limited capitalisation systems to the “supplementary” social security 
of the public system, although it called on the need to maintain tax incentives. The Agreement 
about Social Security Measures of 13-7-2006 refers to the system’s sustainability, exactly as it stands, 
and always as regards its improvement. The “Document about Revising the Toledo Pact”, dated 
29-1-2010, refers to sustainability, and also exactly as it stands, 14 times. Special attention is paid to 
treating supplementary social provisions, which differs from that made in former agreements or 
pacts. The Sustainability Factor is also supported by Comisiones Obreras (a Spanish trade union) as 
its representative in the Experts Committee to write a report to design the Sustainability Factor 
voted in favour, although he cast a dissenting vote (Miguel Ángel García). Of the 12 members, only 
one voted against, Prof. Santos Ruesga, proposed by the PSOE socialist political party and a usual 
collaborator with the UGT trade union, and there was one abstention, Prof. Tortuero Plaza, also 
proposed by PSOE. 
13Amber Capital: 27.01%; HSBC: 10%; Telefónica: 9.4%; Familia Polanco: 8.4%; Roberto Alcántara 
(Mx): 9.3%; Santander: 4.1%; Adar Capital (Isrl): 5.3% See  
http://www.cnmv.es/Portal/Consultas/DerechosVoto/Notificaciones-Participaciones.aspx?qS={293
75466-e3ed-4044-a168-5140d723a504}; and also  
https://www.prisa.com/uploads/2015/12/descargas-documento-f-20-sec-2014-es.pdf (Date con-
sulted: 15-10-2018). 
14https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mediaset_Espa%C3%B1a_Comunicaci%C3%B3n#Accionariado 
(Date consulted: 15-10-2018). 
15See http://www.inverco.es/archivosdb/ranking-grupos-financieros-jun-2018.pdf (Date consulted: 
15-10-2018). 
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tem’s imminent bankruptcy and the need to move towards compulsory capitali-
sation systems in professional or employment terms. However, they are not the 
only ones to appear16. 
4.3. The Promotional Role of Insurance and Pension Fund  
Management Entities: A Very Profitable Business 
In institutional terms, this new old age protection system model is carried out by 
the Spanish Association of CII, Pensions Funds (INVERCO) and the Spanish 
Union of Insurance Companies and Guaranteeing Offices (UNESPA). Albeit 
there are differences between the two, they defend more private sector interven-
tions in the public old age protection system. 
The model proposed by INVERCO17 involves three pillars, of which the last 
two are of a capitalisation kind: the second pillar, which falls within the em-
ployment rate framework, will be compulsory and appointed by default, whereas 
the third pillar will be the current “free” one (employment, either individual or 
associated). The second pillar will be financed by a 4% tax payment from sala-
ries: 2% paid by the company, which will lower the tax payment of the first pil-
lar, and 2% by the worker by either reducing the present workers’ tax payments 
or increasing their tax-paying participation. The third pillar will be free, for 
which the above two parties propose maintaining tax incentives, and even a state 
subsidy whose amount would equal the tax payments that workers make 
(UNESPA). For the first pillar, both defend two alternative solutions: a system of 
notional defined contribution (pay-as-you-go) accounts; a basic tax-financed 
state pension (the British model). Most importantly, as pointed out in many 
public appearances, and also in the Committee to renew the Toledo Pact18, lo-
wering the current rate to substitute the public pension would be one way of in-
creasing interest being shown in a free supplementary system. 
Nowadays in Spain, companies that manage pension funds19 have accumu-
lated 74.309 million euros in free supplementary terms (INVERCO Foundation). 
This quantity generates considerable profits from commissions made on deposits 
and their management, which are also free of any effective yields from Pensions 
Funds20. With assets of 110,372.671 thousands of euros (including employment 
plans, associated plans and individual plans)21, it is easy to quantify the amount of 
the generated bonus commissions: 15.155.822 thousands of euros (Table 1). 
 
 
16https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anexo:Grupos_medi%C3%A1ticos_espa%C3%B1oles (Date con-
sulted: 15-10-2018) 
17http://www.inverco.es/archivosdb/resumen-del-informe-fundacion-inverco-sobre-sistemas-de-pe
nsiones.pdf (Date consulted: 15-10-2018);  
http://www.inverco.es/archivosdb/medidas-para-impulsar-los-planes-de-pensiones.pdf  (Date 
consulted: 15-10-2018) 
18http://www.inverco.es/archivosdb/resumen-del-informe-fundacion-inverco-sobre-sistemas-de-pe
nsiones.pdf (Date consulted: 15-10-2018);  
http://www.inverco.es/archivosdb/medidas-para-impulsar-los-planes-de-pensiones.pdf  (Date 
consulted: 15-10-2018) 
19 http://www.inverco.es/38/0/103/2018/6 (Date consulted: 15-10-2018) 
20 http://www.inverco.es/38/0/103/2018/9 (Date consulted: 15-10-2018) 
21http://www.inverco.es/archivosdb/ranking-grupos-financieros-jun-2018.pdf (Date consulted: 15-10-2018). 
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Table 1. PENSION FUNDS (30-6-2018) (source: the authors using INVERCO data). 
 
Assets  
(thousands  
of €) 
% Commission  
on Deposits 
Net  
Management  
Commission 
% Management Commission 
Management Commission  
(thousands of €) 
Set Mixed Variable Set Mixed Variable 
Employment Plans 74,308,433 0.03% 22,293 0.18% 0.18 0.18% 133,755 13,375,518 133,755 
Associated Plans 883,494 0.20% 1767 0.30% 0.30% 0.30% 2650 2650 2650 
Individual Plans 35,180,744 0.20% 70,361 0.85% 1.30% 1.50% 299,036 457,350 527,711 
TOTAL 110,372,671 0.20% 220,745 
   
435,442 13,835,518 664,117 
TOTAL BONUS 15,155,822 
 
An estimate made using the same commissions on the second proposed pillar 
model also provides substantial profits for collective investment societies: with a 
total wages bill (2018) of 141,000 million euros (National Accountancy: *INE 
data; *Spanish National Statistics Institute)22, transferring funds from the public 
system to the private one would amount to 5,640 million euros/year, which 
would generate management commissions23 of approximately 70.5 million eu-
ros/year, and the commissions made from deposits need to be added to this 
quantity. It would also be necessary to add the resources obtained at the third 
level, which will predictably increase if the amount of public pension protec-
tion lowers, even with public funds (state contributions made according to 
UNESPA’s proposal; boosted by taxes). 
However, it is not only a matter of effective economic yields. The fact that 
these private societies accumulate economic resources and the many firms they 
participate24 in confers them enormous power to intervene in public policies, 
 
 
22http://www.inverco.es/archivosdb/c87-ahorro-financiero-de-las-familias-iics-y-fp-2017.pdfhttps://www.ine.es/dyngs/INEbase/es/operacion.htm
?c=Estadistica_C&cid=1254736165950&menu=resultados&idp=1254735576581  
23These commissions have been calculated by applying the new reduced commissions set by Spanish Royal Decree RD 62/2018, of 9 February, 
which come as a mean 1.25%. These new maximum commissions are set to deal with the product’s risk, so they are lower for 
fixed-/mixed-income securities and higher for equity securities. 
24By way of example, the above-cited BlackRock participates in Spain in many companies of all kinds, from mass media to banks, including in-
surance companies, companies working on essential infrastructures, building firms, etc.: Banco Santander SA: 8.43; (9947.4); Banco Bilbao Viz-
caya Argentaria SA: 7.8 (4412); Telefónica SA: 7.5 (3952); Iberdrola SA: 6.4 (3055); Amadeus IT Group SA: 5.5 (1789); Industria de Diseño Textil 
SA: 1.6 (1587.1); Caixabank SA: 4.4 (1278); Abertis Infraestructuras SA: 4.56 (1039); Repsol SA: 3.7 (987); Banco de Sabadell SA: 6.5 (846); Grifols 
SA: 5.3 (585); Ferrovial SA: 3.5 (549); ACS Actividades de Construcción y Servicios SA: 3.8 (471); Distribuidora Internacional de Alimentación 
SA: 16.2 (467); Aena SME SA: 1.5 (465); Bankinter SA: 4.5 (458.6); Red Electrica Corporacion SA: 4.0 (449); Cellnex Telecom SA: 6.4 (384); Gas 
Natural SDG SA: 1.5 (346); Merlin Properties SOCIMI SA: 4.6 (306.6); Endesa SA: 1.31 (301.8); Enagas SA: 4.0 (260.2); Bankia SA: 1.23 (183.0); 
Mediaset España Comunicacion SA: 4.6 (179.6); Inmobiliaria Colonial SOCIMI SA: 3.5 (165.6); Siemens Gamesa Renewable Energy SA: 1.5 
(161); Companía de Distribución Integral Logística Holdings SA: 4.59 (146); Mapfre SA: 1.4 (143.5); Hispania Activos Inmobiliarios SOCIMI SA: 
4.6 (104). 
Lar España Real Estate SOCIMI SA: 5.1 (53.9); Viscofan SA: 1.4 (42.4); Acerinox SA: 0.81 (33.0); Acciona SA: 0.6 (31.2); Prosegur Compañia de 
Seguridad SA: 0.58 (29); Cie Automotive SA: 0.6 (26.5); Zardoya Otis SA: 0.5 (26.0); Grupo Catalana Occidente SA: 0.5 (24); Ebro Foods SA: 0.6 
(22.2); Applus Services SA: 1.1 (21.5); Indra Sistemas SA: 0.79 (19.3); NH Hotel Group SA: 0.7 (19.0); Melia Hotels International SA: 0.5 (17.6); 
Técnicas Reunidas SA: 0.8 (14.5); Construcciones y Auxiliar de Ferrocarriles SA: 0.8 (13.8); Corporacion Financiera Alba SA: 0.37 (13.3); Faes 
Farma SA: 1.5 (13.1); Papeles y Cartones de Europa SA: 0.9 (13); Bolsas y Mercados Espanoles SHMSF SA: 0.4 (12.4); Ence Energía y Celulosa SA: 
0.7 (12.0); Atresmedia Corporación de Medios de Comunicación SA: 0.5 (11.1). 
(Source: https://www.lavanguardia.com/economia/20180506/443279727124/blackrock-investigacion-primera-gestora-fondos.html)  
(Date consulted: 15-10-2018). 
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which will increase because the more resources they accumulate, the stronger 
their power will be, which poses a risk for democratic systems. There is also the 
matter of lack of transparency for the actual and final shares ownership of these 
finance companies’ conglomerates in which the participation of public State au-
thoritarian institutions of much penetration power cannot be ruled out. The EU 
is beginning to become aware of the danger of allowing strategic sectors of over-
seas investment to be in control25. Just over a year ago, the Community Law-
maker presented a Regulation Proposal, which establishes a framework to con-
trol direct overseas investments in the EU, particularly in some strategic sectors 
(mass media, among others), which completes the legal series26 that refers to the 
cautionary evaluation of purchases and increases in participations in financial 
institutions (i.e., credit companies, investment companies and insurance com-
panies/guaranteeing offices). This legal series does not include pensions funds, 
which are subject to more specific regulations that adapt to the activities of the 
above-cited organisation27 with a specific regulatory organisation28, but whose 
control may appear to be limited to solvency and transparency, without this new 
risk being taken into consideration. The progressive transfer of economic re-
sources from workers and businesspeople from public insurance systems to pri-
vate capitalisation systems should also be considered a strategic sector because 
future European workers’ old age protection might be at risk. 
According to INVERCO data, the world’s assets held in Pension Funds are 
made up of 5 billion euros (according to the Latin meaning29). The GDP of the 
whole Eurozone stands at 11 billion euros; the GDP of the USA is 17 billion eu-
ros; the GDP of Spain for 2018 is 1 billion euros. This last case has a national 
public debt of approximately 98%. According to the same data, the volume of 
assets of CII and Pensions Funds represented 102.3% of the world’s GDP, as es-
timated in 2017 by the IMF30. According to Public Treasury data (July 2018), 
most of this public debt is in the hands of resident finance institutions (16.78%), 
 
 
25Brussels, 13.9.2017 COM(2017) 487, final  
https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2017/ES/COM-2017-487-F1-ES-MAIN-PART-1.P
DFll  
26Directive 2007/44/EC of the European Parliament and Council, of 5 September 2007, which mod-
ifies Directive 92/49/EEC of the European Council and Directives 2002/83/EC, 2004/39/EC, 
2005/68/EC and 2006/48/EC as regards regulations about the procedures and evaluation criteria 
applicable to the cautionary evaluation of purchases and increasing participations in the finance 
sector; Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and Council, of 26 June 2013, about 
access to the activity performed by credit companies and the prudential supervision of credit and 
investment companies, which modifies Directive 2002/87/EC and repeals Directives 2006/48/EC 
and 2006/49/EC; Directive 2009/138/EC of the European Parliament and Council, of 25 November 
2009, about life insurance, access to the insurance/guaranteeing activity and perfoming it (Solvency 
II); Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and Council, of 15 May 2014, about financial 
instrument markets,with which Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU were modified. 
27DIRECTIVE 2003/41/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND COUNCIL, of 3 June 2003, 
about activities and supervising pension funds from employment. 
28European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA). (EU) REGULATION No. 
1093/2010 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND COUNCIL, of 24 November 2010. 
291 billion = 1 million millions. In the Anglosaxon culture, 1 billion = 1 thousand millions. 
30http://www.inverco.es/archivosdb/c87-ahorro-financiero-de-las-familias-iics-y-fp-2017.pdf.  
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insurance companies (81%), pension funds (1.75%), investment funds (3.01%) 
and other financial institutions (0.07%). In all, 31.42% of this public debt is 
linked to financial institutions. The historic analysis of how this debt has evolved 
is also very significant as far as owner institutions are concerned31. 
5. An Epilogue and Three Conclusions 
What is, to date, a high substitution rate for public pensions in Spain is the main 
stumbling block for the supplementary “free” Social Security to take off in Spain 
(INVERCO). Moreover, the traditional trust placed by Spaniards in the Spanish 
SSS may lead to voluntary subscriptions to supplementary systems of social 
provisions. Both these obstacles have been stirred up (in own interests). Suc-
cessive legal reforms will imply quite a drastic reduction in the substitution 
rate of the retirement pension, and important mass media have already put 
into practice aggressive campaigns to announce the economic instability of pub-
lic pay-as-you-go systems to encourage them being converted into private capi-
talisation systems. European SSS have involved demarketising social needs, but it 
would seem that only 50 years later, the direct descendents of those generations 
once again opt for them to return to the market, although their “sustainability” 
would not be guaranteed, precisely as experience has demonstrated. As the 
famous “too big to fail” doctrine is still very recently set in collective memory, 
and has cost citizens so much money32, the resources that accumulate to protect 
old age in the hands of private institutions which, in some cases become the 
possible screen of the capital of States that are either totalitarian or doubtfully 
democratic, are a reason for much concern. 
Finally, three conclusions can be drawn: 
1) The change of paradigm for protecting old age has commenced. The public 
pay-as-you-go system will gradually give way to the capitalisation of work-
ers/business people’s economic resources (and perhaps also the State’s) in the 
private domain. 
2) We face a “non-neutral” change in economic terms. The main beneficiaries 
will be the financial institutions or insurance companies managing these funds, 
which will immediately receive major yields as a management and related com-
missions concept. 
3) Socially speaking, their profits are far from being guaranteed because a 
 
 
31https://datosmacro.expansion.com/deuda/espana. 
32See the informative note of the Bank of Spain about public financial aid in the process to restruc-
ture the Spanish banking system:  
https://www.bde.es/f/webbde/GAP/Secciones/SalaPrensa/NotasInformativas/Briefing_notes/es/nota
be070917.pdf.  
See also the informative note about the “Report on the financial and banking crisis in Spain, 
2008-2014”, published by the Bank of Spain, which indicates a figure of 62,754 million euros in the 
net resources made to the financial sector by the Fund for Orderly Bank Restructuring (FROB, in 
Spanish) and by the Deposit Guarantee Fund (DGF). It is estimated that only 1 in every 4 paid eu-
ros will be recovered.  
https://www.bde.es/f/webbde/GAP/Secciones/SalaPrensa/NotasInformativas/Briefing_notes/es/nota
be160617.pdf.  
 
A. Vicente-Palacio 
 
 
DOI: 10.4236/blr.2020.111012 181 Beijing Law Review 
 
change is also taking place from the defined taxpaying-provisions system to a 
defined tax-paying system with no defined provisions. Hence the risk of growing 
old has started on the road towards “de-socialisation”. 
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